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Abstract
We examine the potential importance of consumer ambiguity aversion
for asset prices and how consumption ￿ uctuations in￿ uence consumer wel-
fare. First, considering a simple Mehra-Prescott-style endowment econ-
omy with a representative agent facing consumption ￿ uctuations cali-
brated to match U.S. data, we study to what extent ambiguity aversion
can deliver asset prices that are consistent with data: a high return on
equity and a low return on riskfree bonds. For some con￿gurations of
preference parameters￿ a discount factor, a degree of relative risk aver-
sion, and a measure of ambiguity aversion￿ we ￿nd that it can. Then,
we use these parameter con￿gurations to investigate how much consumers
would be willing to pay to reduce endowment ￿ uctuations to zero, thus
delivering a Lucas-style welfare cost of ￿ uctuations. These costs turn out
to be very large: consumers are willing to pay over 10% of consumption
in permanent terms.
1 Introduction
We examine the potential importance of consumers￿ambiguity aversion in the
context of macroeconomic ￿ uctuations: we ask how consumers price risky ￿ uctu-
ations and how the ￿ uctuations in￿ uence consumer welfare. Ambiguity aversion,
which is a way of formalizing preferences that are consistent with the Ellsberg
paradox, captures a form of violation of Savage￿ s axioms of subjective proba-
bility. Instead, consumers behave as if a range of probability distributions are
possible and as if they are averse toward the ￿unknown￿ . With the typical
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1parameterized representation of ambiguity aversion, consumers have minmax
preferences, thus maximizing utility based on the worst possible belief within
some given set of feasible beliefs. Thus, in an economy with a small amount of
randomness, there are ￿rst-order e⁄ects on utility if there is ambiguity about
this randomness. Thus, ambiguity aversion is in contrast to the standard model,
where risk aversion leads to second-order e⁄ects on utility.
The ￿rst step in our work is to look at asset pricing in a simple Mehra-
Prescott-style endowment economy. Here, we demonstrate how larger equity
premia can be obtained by assuming ambiguity aversion, along with low riskfree
rates. The key parameter in the model is the amount of ambiguity aversion, but
it interacts nonlinearly with other parameters, such as the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion. There is no direct evidence of which we are aware that allows us
to calibrate the ambiguity parameter, but we show a range of calibrations that
roughly match the average returns on risky and riskless assets.1
The second step of the work is to ask how consumers assess the ￿ uctuations
from a welfare point of view. Thus, we redo the Lucas (2003)-style calculation
whereby it is asked by how much the representative-consumer utility would rise
(expressed as a permanent increase in consumption) if all ￿ uctuations around the
trend were eliminated. The answer, in the economy with ambiguity, naturally
depends on the amount of ambiguity: since ambiguity is a form of ￿worry￿
about random ￿ uctuations, the elimination of the randomness would eliminate
the worry, and consumers would be better o⁄ as a result. Here, we use asset
prices as a way of calibrating the ambiguity parameter. That is, we use the
￿rst step in our work as a calibration, and then do the Lucas (2003) calculation
based on it. We ￿nd the welfare costs to be of the order of magnitude of 15% of
consumption. This is a huge number (Lucas found about a tenth on 1%), and
it is accounted for by allowing larger risk aversion and introducing ambiguity
aversion.
In assessing how ambiguity might be important in the economy, it seems
relevant to consider whether there is heterogeneity in the extent to which di⁄er-
ent consumers are ambiguity-averse. The third part of our paper examines how
heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion in￿ uences wealth distribution, and thus in-
directly asset pricing, since consumers￿in￿ uence on prices operates through (is
￿weighted by￿ ) their wealth holdings. We consider a simple case and assume
that half of the agents display a given amount of ambiguity aversion while the
rest (the ￿standard agents￿ ) do not. We specialize to a logarithmic period utility
function and iid and symmetric shocks. For this particular case, we are able to
show that the standard agents will increasingly dominate in the pricing of the as-
sets over time. Furthermore, with this heterogeneity, the most ambiguity-averse
agents become (almost) non-participants in the stock market over time; thus,
we obtain endogenous limited participation. In conclusion, although ambiguity
aversion shows great potential in providing new asset-pricing implications and
in allowing us to think of a reason why the elimination of aggregate ￿ uctuations
might be quite costly, heterogeneity in the degree of ambiguity aversion will
1For a survey on the equity premium puzzle, see Kocherlakota (1996).
2tend to limit these implications and mainly have e⁄ects on wealth distribution
and the di⁄erences in portfolios across consumers.
2 The economy
This is an in￿nite-horizon exchange economy. Production is exogenous: the
economy has a tree that pays dividends every period. The dividend grows at
a random rate, which has a two-state support given by (￿1;￿2) and follows a
￿rst-order Markov process. The transition probabilities are given by ￿ss0 ￿the
probability of going to state s0 if today￿ s state is s, with s;s0 = 1;2.




￿11 ￿ v1 ￿12 + v1
￿21 ￿ v2 ￿22 + v2
￿
; (1)
where vs 2 [￿a;a] (s = 1;2) with restrictions on a such that all probabilities
are in [0;1]. Parameter a measures the amount of ambiguity in the economy.








where c is consumption, u(c) is the period utility function, and ￿st is a set of
transition probability laws given the history st today.
Aversion to ambiguity is captured by the ￿minimization￿part in the utility
formulation above: the consumer behaves with pessimism, i.e., he assumes the
worst possible probability distribution. For an axiomatic foundation for this
preference formulation, see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for the static setting
and Epstein and Wang (1994) and Epstein and Schneider (2003) for a multi-
period setting.
In section 3 we describe the model with a representative agent and in section
4 we look at the welfare costs of consumption variability. Finally, in section 5
we consider a model with both ambiguity-averse agents and ￿standard￿agents
who do not view the economy as ambiguous.
3 Representative-agent asset pricing
In this section and for simplicity, we ￿rst consider an ambiguity-averse repre-
sentative agent with a logarithmic period utility function and discount factor ￿.
In addition, we ￿rst assume that shocks are iid and symmetric, i.e., ￿ss0 = 0:5.
After that, we consider a CRRA period utility function and assume serially
correlated shocks. Then, we calibrate the economy and report the model￿ s per-
formance.
There is an equity share that is competitively traded and a riskless bond
that is in zero net supply. We denote the consumer￿ s bond and equity holdings
b and e, respectively.
3The representative agent holds the tree and thus, his consumption in every
period is the dividend of the tree. A log-period utility function together with
the assumption of iid shocks imply that p, the price of the tree, will be linear
in d, the dividend, and independent of the state: p(d) = ^ pd.
The ambiguity-averse consumer puts a higher weight on the bad outcome
than what is warranted by the objective probability; that is, he becomes pes-
simistic because he is worried about that outcome and does not know its prob-
ability.
We assume that ￿1 > ￿2 so that the bad outcome is state 2 ￿the outcome
where the dividend is low. The objective probability of this state is 0.5, but he
chooses the belief in the bad state. His belief is ￿(v) = 0:5 ￿ v and he chooses
v from the set v 2 [￿a;a]. The higher is a, the more ambiguity there is in the
economy.
The problem of the representative agent with wealth today given by w is
V (w) = max
e log[w ￿ p(d)e] + ￿ min
v2[￿a;a]
(￿ ￿ v)V (w0




1 = [￿1d + p(d￿1)]e;
and
w0
2 = [￿2d + p(d￿2)]e:
Here, for ease of notation, we have excluded the bond (since bond holdings
must be zero in equilibrium). Moreover, the budget constraint: c + p(d)e +
q(d)b = w where w = [d + p(d)]e￿1 + b￿1 (e￿1 and b￿1 are equity and bond
holdings chosen in the previous period) has been substituted away. The Euler
equation for equity is
p(d)u0(d) =
￿ f(￿ ￿ a)[￿1d + p(￿1d)]u0(￿1d) + (1 ￿ ￿ + a)[￿2d + p(￿2d)]u0(￿2d)g: (3)
Clearly, p is linear in d (a constant times d), whenever u0(c) = c￿￿ (here,
￿ = 1). Since the period utility is logarithmic, the price of equity does not
depend on beliefs because the payo⁄ and the inverse of marginal utility (u0) are
proportional to ￿d so that the payo⁄ times marginal utility is the same in both
states. Thus, p(d) =
￿
1￿￿d solves the Euler equation above: the price of equity
is independent of ￿ and a.






1) > V (w0
2), so the solution for v is a corner, i.e., v = a. In section 5, we
show that v can be an interior solution when the economy is populated by both
ambiguity-averse and standard consumers.
The Euler equation for bonds similarly gives
q(d)u0(d) = ￿ f(￿ ￿ a)u0(￿1d) + (1 ￿ ￿ + a)u0(￿2d)g: (4)


















4The higher is a ￿the more ambiguity aversion there is in the economy ￿the
higher is the belief that the bad state will happen, and the higher is the present
value of one unit tomorrow, since the probability weight placed on the state
with a high marginal utility is higher.
The net expected return on equity, ERe, is given by
ERe =
￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿2
￿
￿ 1; (6)
and it is independent of the belief. The net return on bonds, Rb, decreases when
ambiguity aversion increases, because Rb = 1
q ￿ 1.
The equity premium in this economy is
ERe ￿ Rb =




￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)￿1 + ￿￿2 + a(￿1 ￿ ￿2)]
: (7)
If we make ￿ = 0:5, then the equity premium in this economy is





￿ [0:5(￿1 + ￿2) + a(￿1 ￿ ￿2)]
: (8)





Using ￿1 = 1:02, ￿2 = 1:01; and ￿ = 0:98, the equity premium is 0:5%, which
is 200 times larger than the equity premium for the same parameter values
when a = 0 ￿the standard model. Although this is an example, and not a
calibration, it illustrates that the e⁄ect of ambiguity on asset prices/returns can
be substantial.
If the period utility is u(d) = d
1￿￿




















We now assume that the period utility is u(c) = c
1￿￿
1￿￿ and the shocks are serially
correlated.
The problem of the representative agent with wealth today given by w and
today￿ s shock s is
Vs(w) = max
e
u[w ￿ ps(d)e] + ￿ min
vs2[￿a;a]
(￿s1 ￿ vs)V1(w0




1 = [￿1d + p1(d￿1)]e;
w0
2 = [￿2d + p2(d￿2)]e:
5The Euler equation for equity is
ps(d)u0(d) =
￿ f(￿s1 ￿ vs)[￿1d + p1(￿1d)]u0(￿1d) + (￿s2 + vs)[￿2d + p2(￿2d)]u0(￿2d)g (10)
The price of equity is still linear in d, and is now given by






1 (1 + k1) + (￿s2 + vs)￿
1￿￿
2 (1 + k2)
￿
; (12)
for s = 1;2.










+ ￿(￿12 + a)￿
1￿￿
2 + ￿
2(￿12 + a)(￿21 ￿ a)(￿1￿2)1￿￿
￿




















+ ￿(￿21 ￿ a)￿
1￿￿
1 + ￿
2(￿21 ￿ a)(￿12 + a)(￿1￿2)1￿￿
￿









2(￿12 + a)(￿21 ￿ a)(￿1￿2)1￿￿
Thus, wealth in the next period is:
w0
1 = ￿1d(1 + k1); (13)
and
w0
2 = ￿2d(1 + k2): (14)


























for s = 1;2.
The conditional expected net return on equity is
ERe
s =
￿s1 [￿1d + p1(￿1d)] + ￿s2 [￿2d + p2(￿2d)]
ps(d)
￿ 1 (16)
for s = 1;2, and the unconditional expected net return on equity ERe, is
￿ERe
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)ERe
2 ￿ 1
where the invariant probability ￿ solves
￿ = ￿11￿ + ￿21(1 ￿ ￿): (17)
6Therefore,
ERe = ￿








￿11￿1(1 + k1) + ￿12￿2(1 + k2)
k1
+(1￿￿)
















































Finally, the equity premium is given by
ERe ￿ Rb:
3.2 Calibration and evaluation of asset prices
As in Mehra and Prescott (1985), we now select the parameters of the model so
that the average growth rate of per capita consumption, the standard deviation
of the growth rate of per capita consumption and the ￿rst-order serial correlation
of this growth rate, all with respect to the model￿ s stationary distribution, match
the sample values for the U.S. economy between 1889-1978.
The values of the parameters are ￿ = 0:43 (where ￿11 = ￿22 = ￿ and
￿12 = ￿21 = (1 ￿ ￿)), ￿ = 0:036; ￿ = 0:018; ￿1 = 1 + ￿ + ￿ = 1:054, and
￿2 = 1 + ￿ ￿ ￿ = 0:982.
Figure 1 shows the return on the risk-free bond, the expected return on
equity and the equity premium for ￿ = 0:95, a = 0:2, and for a range of ￿
between 0 and 10.
The equity premium is higher as ￿ increases. Note, for example, that for
￿ = 8, the risk-free return is 4:72%, the expected return on equity is 8:77%, and
the resulting equity premium is 4:05%.
Figure 2 shows the return on the risk-free asset, the expected return on eq-
uity, and the equity premium for ￿ = 0:95, ￿ = 2, and the ambiguity parameter
a in a range between 0 and 0.43.
The equity premium increases with the amount of ambiguity in the economy.
For example, for a = 0:3, the return on the bond is 4:27%, the expected return
on equity is 6:98%, and the resulting equity premium is 2:71%. As a comparison,
the largest equity premium that Mehra and Prescott (1985) were able to obtain
was 0:35%.
74 Potential bene￿ts of eliminating consumption
￿ uctuations
We ￿rst calculate the costs of consumption ￿ uctuations when shocks are iid:









[￿V (￿1d) + (1 ￿ ￿)V (￿2d)]
￿
: (21)
The solution for V (d) is














Moreover, v = a since V (d) is increasing in d.
Eliminating consumption ￿ uctuations will deliver the present value of total
utility corresponding to consuming the expected value of the dividend every


















The costs of consumption variability are given by ￿ where ￿ solves:
(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿











Calculating the utility of the deterministic growth path is more evolving
when the shocks are serially correlated. To this end, we will now introduce
some notation.


























8The ￿rst row of this expression, ￿
e
t, is the expected growth rate between now and
t periods from now if the state now is state 1; and the second row, ￿
e
t, is the
expected growth rate between now and t periods from now if the state now is

















The utility of the deterministic growth path, where growth is equal to the




























The present value of total utility when the dividend is d and the shock is s, is
given by
Vs(d) = Asd1￿￿ (32)




2 (￿12 ￿ ￿22)
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿














1 (￿21 ￿ ￿11)
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿









2(￿21 ￿ a)(￿12 + a)(￿1￿2)1￿￿￿:








































Figure 3 plots the costs of business cycles for ￿ = 0:9, and ￿ = 2 as a
function of a; i.e., it shows a ￿comparative-statics￿exercise with respect to the
ambiguity parameter only.
Clearly, more ambiguity aversion increases the costs of business cycles. By
eliminating ￿ uctuations (if that is possible), the government would eliminate
the ￿rst-order negative e⁄ect on utility that consumers experience from random
consumption.
9We continue with comparative statics with respect to various parameters
and then ￿nally describe the welfare costs when the parameters are selected to
match the asset prices.
Figure 4 shows the costs of business cycles for ￿ = 0:7, and a = 0:1 as a
function of ￿. Consumption ￿ uctuations hurt more the more risk averse is a
consumer. However, this result is not true for very high values of ￿ or very high
values of a.
Finally, ￿gure 5 plots the costs of business cycles for ￿ = 2 and a = 0:2 as a
function of ￿.
We now look at the costs of ￿ uctuations when the asset prices match the
data. As was discussed brie￿ y above, this can be accomplished in di⁄erent ways,
and each of these is associated with a di⁄erent cost. Table 1 illustrates that the
welfare costs￿ or, rather, the potential welfare costs￿ of cycles are huge. They
do not di⁄er markedly across the di⁄erent parameter con￿gurations.
Table 1: Costs of business cycles for selected parameters and a > 0
￿ ￿ a ERe ￿ Rb ￿1 ￿2
0.95 13.74 0.2040 6.18% 12.48% 12.46%
0.94 13.36 0.2223 6.18% 12.88% 12.86%
0.93 12.95 0.2420 6.18% 13.32% 13.30%
0.92 12.46 0.2642 6.18% 13.86% 13.85%
0.91 11.98 0.2879 6.18% 14.43% 14.41%
0.90 11.37 0.3160 6.18% 15.19% 15.17%
0.89 10.70 0.3480 6.18% 16.06% 16.05%
0.88 9.83 0.3890 6.18% 17.33% 17.32%
0.873 8.94 0.4300 6.18% 18.76% 18.75%
Finally, for comparison, we show the associated costs for a = 0. These are
also high compared to Lucas￿(2003) numbers, since ￿ is high, but of an order
of magnitude lower than above.
Table 2: Costs of business cycles for selected parameters and a = 0
￿ ￿ a Rb ERe ￿ Rb ￿1 ￿2
0.95 13.74 0 19.49% 4.40% 2.55% 2.53%
0.94 13.36 0 20.67% 4.25% 2.41% 2.39%
0.93 12.95 0 21.85% 4.08% 2.28% 2.26%
0.92 12.46 0 23.01% 3.88% 2.15% 2.13%
0.91 11.98 0 24.16% 3.68% 2.02% 2.01%
0.90 11.37 0 25.25% 3.43% 1.89% 1.88%
0.89 10.70 0 26.27% 3.15% 1.76% 1.75%
0.88 9.83 0 27.12% 2.80% 1.62% 1.61%
0.873 8.94 0 27.42% 2.45% 1.50% 1.49%
105 Heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion
We now consider two types of agents whose ambiguity aversions di⁄er. We look
at a general planning problem ￿rst, and then focus on the case with iid shocks.
Later, we look at the case of serial correlation in more detail.
5.1 The planner￿ s problem
The state vector is (d;￿;s): today￿ s dividend, the weight the planner puts on
consumer 1, and today￿ s shock. The planner solves the problem
Vs(d;￿) = max
c1;c2;z1s0;z2s0







































c1 + c2 = d; (36)
where ci is agent i￿ s consumption, i = 1;2, zi is next period￿ s present-value
utility for agent i, ￿s1 (vi) = ￿s1￿vi; and ￿s2 (vi) = ￿s2+vi. The ￿rst constraint
(35) makes the problem recursive and the second constraint (36) is the resource
constraint. This formulation which is based on Lucas and Stokey (1984) is also
used in Alonso (2007).
Taking FOCs with respect to the consumption of agents 1 and 2, we have
c1 = ￿d; (37)
and
c2 = (1 ￿ ￿)d; (38)









(1 ￿ ￿)(￿s1 ￿ v2)
; (39)









(1 ￿ ￿)(￿s2 + v2)
: (40)
After some algebra, we can rewrite the planner￿ s problem as
Vs(d;￿) = max
c1;c2















￿ss0 [￿v1 + (1 ￿ ￿)v2]
; (41)
and
c1 + c2 = d: (42)
Note that ￿s1 [￿v1 + (1 ￿ ￿)v2] = ￿s1￿￿v1￿(1￿￿)v2 and ￿s2 [￿v1 + (1 ￿ ￿)v2] =
￿s2 + ￿v1 + (1 ￿ ￿)v2.
5.1.1 A special case: no serial correlation and a2 = 0
In the simpler case where shocks are iid and symmetric and consumer 2 is not
ambiguity-averse (v2 = a2 = 0), the planner￿ s problem becomes2:
V (d;￿) = max
c1;c2;￿0
s0


















c1 + c2 = d: (44)
Using the FOCs for consumption, we obtain c1 = ￿d and c2 = (1 ￿ ￿)d, so
we get





(￿ ￿ ￿v)V (d￿1;￿
0















1 ￿ ￿ + v
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v
: (46)
2From now on, we drop the subscript on v and a, since it should be clear that they refer
only to consumer 1.
12Here, we conjecture that V (d;￿) takes the form Alogd + W(￿). This guess
delivers


















Inspecting this functional equation, it can be seen that A = 1
1￿￿ works and























1 ￿ ￿ + v
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v
￿￿￿
:
This is a one-dimensional dynamic programming problem delivering optimal
v as a function of ￿ and hence, a law of motion for ￿. The variable ￿ also corre-
sponds to the fraction of the total wealth￿ the current dividend plus the value
of the tree￿ owned by agent 1 in a complete-markets equilibrium. The following
￿gures for W(￿) and v(￿) below assume the same values for the parameters as
speci￿ed at the end of section 3.
Figure 6, for W(￿), reveals a shape similar to log￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿, which is the
(constant) ￿ ow utility of a planner in a two-type economy where no consumer
has ambiguity aversion.
Figure 7, for the optimal choice of v, shows that v is close to zero and interior
at ￿rst (for small ￿￿ s), and then it increases monotonically in ￿ and reaches the
upper bound a for a value of ￿ a little above 0.9. We will interpret these ￿ndings
in more detail in the following sections.
135.2 The special (iid) case: the decentralized economy
Markets are complete and consumers trade in equity shares of the tree and in a
riskless bond. The consumer￿ s problem is given recursively by
V (d;w;￿) = max
c;b;e
(










subject to the budget constraint
c + p(d;￿)e + q(d;￿)b = w; (47)
w0












s0 = gs0(d;￿); (49)
where (d;w;￿) is the state vector. As before, w is the consumer￿ s wealth today,
p is the price of equity, e is the fraction of the equity share held by the consumer,
q is the price today of a bond that pays one unit of the consumption good next
period, and b is the holdings of the bond. (The argument d is included for g
only for completeness; it will not be there under the log assumption.)




for i 2 f1;2g.
Total wealth in the economy when the state variable is (d;￿) is d + p(d;￿).
Thus, market clearing requires, for all values of the arguments,
c1(d;￿[d + p(d;￿)];￿) + c2(d;(1 ￿ ￿)[d + p(d;￿)];￿) = d; (53)
b1(d;￿[d + p(d;￿)];￿) + b2(d;(1 ￿ ￿)[d + p(d;￿)];￿) = 0; (54)
and
e1(d;￿[d + p(d;￿)];￿) + e2(d;(1 ￿ ￿)[d + p(d;￿)];￿) = 1: (55)










1s0(d;￿) ￿ b1(d;￿[d + p(d;￿)];￿)+e1(d;￿[d + p(d;￿)];￿)(d￿s0+p[d￿s0;gs0(d;￿)]);
14and
w0
2s0(d;￿) ￿ b2(d;(1￿￿)[d + p(d;￿)];￿)+e2(d;(1￿￿)[d + p(d;￿)];￿)(d￿s0+p[d￿s0;gs0(d;￿)]):
Now we will show how to ￿nd prices and portfolio allocations in this economy.
We use the planning problem and we identify the ￿ in that problem with the
corresponding variable here: the planning weight on agent 1 equals the relative
fraction of total wealth held in equilibrium by this agent.
















￿ ^ q(￿): (57)
As shown in section 3, the price of the bond is increasing in a. In addition here,
the price of bonds is increasing in ￿. We show below that the ambiguity-averse
agents demand the bond. The bond is more valuable when marginal utility of
consumption is high (which occurs in the bad state). As ￿ increases, there is a
higher demand for the bond, so its price goes up.
































￿(1 ￿ ￿ + v)
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v
￿ ￿; (60)
from the planning problem. (The inequalities above follow since v ￿ 0.)
The latter laws of motion reveal that the ambiguity-averse agent gains in
relative wealth when the state is bad and loses when it is good: his probability
￿beliefs￿are tilted toward the bad state.
We see that p(d;￿) = d^ p(￿) solves this equation, delivering








+ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v)
￿





This is a functional equation: it holds for all ￿ (recall that v may also depend










So the price of equity does not depend on ￿.
15The equilibrium holdings of equity of consumer 1, which can be obtained by
using the expression for future wealth, w0
1s0 = b1 +e1(￿s0d+p0
s0), together with












￿ ^ e1(￿): (64)
Thus, the equity holdings of agent 1 are independent of the level of d. We see




2 = ￿, then ^ e1(￿) = ￿: the consumer￿ s share
of the tree equals his initial share of total wealth.
On the other hand, when v > 0 (recall that wlog we use ￿1 > ￿2), we know
that ￿
0
1 < ￿ < ￿
0
2, which makes the holdings of equity lower as compared to
the case when v = 0. That is, the ambiguity-averse agent will have a smaller
share of equity holdings than his overall wealth would otherwise prescribe: this
is a portfolio composition e⁄ect. How much his portfolio composition will be
changed must be numerically examined.
We can also examine the portfolio e⁄ect by looking at the amount of bonds







1 ￿ ^ e1(￿)
￿
: (65)
It is interesting to note here that bond holdings are proportional to d. Naturally,
they are zero in the special case v = 0, when e1 = ￿ and ￿
0 = ￿. Moreover,
￿
0




























1, and thus we conclude, consistently with the above insights re-
garding equity holdings, that the ambiguity-averse agent increases his bond
holdings relative to the v = 0 zero-bonds case: his portfolio composition moves
away from equity and into bonds because he is more pessimistic than person 2
in his perception of the return (performance) of equity.
There are two sources of uncertainty in this economy: (i) the payo⁄of equity
and (ii) the price of the bond. The price of the bond depends on ￿, the relative
wealth of consumer 1, and this variable is random. In particular, since ￿
0
2 > ￿ >
￿
0
1, the price of the bond, q, increases if state 2 occurs and it decreases if state
1 occurs.







q(￿), and b(￿) for agent 1. Once more, the parameter values are ￿1 = 1:02,
￿2 = 1:01, and ￿ = 0:98.
As we see from the graphs in ￿gure 8, the ambiguity-averse consumer short-
sells equity for most values of ￿. The reason for this is the following. State 2 is
bad for the ambiguity-averse consumer for two reasons: (i) the payo⁄from equity
16is low and (ii) the price of the bond increases so that it makes the good next
period more expensive (this consumer does not own any goods next period).
Therefore, to provide protection against the former type of uncertainty, the
ambiguity-averse consumer buys bonds and to provide protection against the
latter type of uncertainty, the ambiguity-averse consumer sells equity short.
The behavior of the ambiguity-averse consumer can be separately described
for di⁄erent ranges of ￿. First, when ￿ is zero, the ambiguity-averse consumers
have zero aggregate wealth. In this case, the price of bonds is solely determined
by the ￿standard￿agents and it does not ￿ uctuate. Since there is no uncertainty
on q, ambiguity-averse consumers only hold bonds. As shown in the below
section, a very small amount of pessimism rationalizes this choice.
If ￿ is positive but small, changes in ￿ do not have any considerable e⁄ects
on q, so the randomness in q is not so important. Then, ambiguity-averse
consumers mainly hold bonds and short-sell equity somewhat to protect against








for a small value of the belief v; that is, v is still an interior solution.
When ￿ is high, ambiguity aversion makes the ￿ uctuations in q very large.
Agents buy bonds and short-sell equity more heavily. The value of v is larger,
re￿ ecting more pessimism about state 2. Since V is decreasing in ￿ and increas-






2 needs to be much larger than w0







2) ￿and hence still make v an interior solution. This is achieved by
short-selling equity even more heavily.
When ￿ is very close to 1, v is a corner solution since the ambiguity-averse
agents need to hold most of the stock and they are pessimistic about state
1. The ￿ uctuations in ￿ have become very small, and the uncertainty result-
ing from changes in q is therefore also very small and ambiguity-averse agents
consequently do not need to short-sell the stock.
5.3 Relative consumption and wealth in the long run
We can analytically show3 that
E(￿
0j￿) < ￿; (68)
i.e., that over time, the relative wealth of the ambiguity-averse agents decreases
toward zero: these agents disappear, economically speaking.








so the rate at which they disappear goes to zero: they remain with positive
wealth for a long, long time.
3The proofs of expressions (68) and (69) are in the appendix. This result and the following
discussion are reminiscent of the analysis in Coen-Pirani (2004).
176 Conclusion
In this essay, we have studied asset pricing and evaluated the welfare costs of
￿ uctuations in consumption for an economy where consumers are ambiguity-
averse. First, we have shown parameter con￿gurations under which the equity
premium is quite large (and the riskfree rate is small); the ability to match
these return features comes from the ability of ambiguity aversion to generate
￿rst-order e⁄ects on prices, which sets it apart from risk aversion, which op-
erates through second-order e⁄ects. Ambiguity aversion has ￿rst-order e⁄ects,
in essence, because consumers behave as if they believed that the good return
outcomes to be less likely than they really are.
Second, using the calibrations that deliver realistic asset prices, we have
shown that the welfare bene￿ts of eliminating consumption ￿ uctuations need
not be as small as those in Lucas￿ s (2003) calculations. This is not to say that
the bene￿ts are large: the numbers we obtain are, just like Lucas￿ s numbers,
upper bounds, and these upper bounds leave open what the costs of stabilization
(say, in the form of distortions) might be, and also leave open whether full
stabilization is even feasible. Nevertheless, it is valuable to note that these
bounds can be as large as 15% of consumption when asset prices are matched
by the model.
Third, by exploring an economy where some consumers are ambiguity-averse
and others are not, we ￿nd an important quali￿cation to the above ￿ndings: it
appears that, by making consistently ￿bad bets￿ , ambiguity-averse consumers
will see their relative wealth decline over time, and thereby asset prices will
be increasingly dominated by standard consumers. Note also that these bad
bets are not bad in the sense of ￿crazy portfolios￿ , but simply in the sense of
delivering a lower return on average by not investing enough in stock. In partic-
ular, if ambiguity aversion is su¢ ciently large, the ambiguity-averse consumers
choose to not participate at all in the stock market: the other, standard con-
sumers hold all risk (and get all the high returns on average).4 To make this
wealth distribution not converge to an extreme outcome, one could consider an
overlapping-generations structure, where in each generation of newborns with
zero debt, some are ambiguity-averse; that way, a signi￿cant part of aggregate
wealth will always belong to ambiguity-averse consumers.
4It is interesting to note that there is (close to) non-participation for a large range of values
for ￿. Thus, without having to assume that there are costs of transacting/investing in stock,
we can use this setting to derive conditions under which a large fraction of the population￿
the ambiguity-averse￿ (almost) do not have any stock. This kind of result was also derived
in Epstein and Schneider￿ s (2007) work. Exact non-participation cannot be obtained here
because the risk-free rate ￿uctuates with the endowment shock; because the ambiguity-averse
agents hold bonds, it is optimal for them to use equity to hedge against the interest-rate risk.
This risk, however, is very small for a large range of (low) values of ￿: when ￿ is zero, the
risk-free rate is constant, and thus not until the ambiguity-averse agents have a signi￿cant
fraction of total wealth will these ￿uctuations be large enough to induce signi￿cant equity
holdings for these agents.
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19Appendix
A1 Heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion
6.0.1 The planning problem
We can reinstate the problem:
Vs(d;￿) = max
c1;c2















￿ss0 [￿v1 + (1 ￿ ￿)v2]
; (70)
and
c1 + c2 = d: (71)
Taking FOCs, we obtain c1 = ￿d and c2 = (1 ￿ ￿)d. The rewritten problem
becomes:





[￿s1 ￿ ￿v1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)v2]V1(d￿1;￿
0









￿ss0 [￿v1 + (1 ￿ ￿)v2]
: (72)
We conjecture that Vs(d;￿) takes the form Alogd + Ws(￿). This guess
delivers















Special case: serial correlation and a2 = 0






















c1 + c2 = d: (74)
Using the FOCs for consumption, we obtain c1 = ￿d and c2 = (1 ￿ ￿)d so
we get

























Here, we conjecture that Vs(d;￿) takes the form Alogd+Ws(￿). This guess
delivers





(￿s1 ￿ ￿vs)(Alog(d￿1) + W1(￿
0





Inspecting the above expression, it can be seen that A = 1


























for s = 1;2. This is a two-dimensional dynamic programming problem that
delivers optimal vs, s = 1;2, as a function of ￿, and hence a law of motion for ￿.
The decentralized economy













subject to the budget constraint
c + ps(d;￿)e + qs(d;￿)b = w; (77)
w0












s0 = gs0(d;￿;s) (79)
21where p is the price of equity, e is the fraction of the equity share held by the
consumer, q is the price today of a bond that pays one unit of the consumption
good next period, and b is the holdings of the bond. (The argument d is included
for g only for completeness; it will not be there under the log assumption.)




for i 2 f1;2g.
Total wealth in the economy when the state variable is (d;￿;s) is d+ps(d;￿).
Thus, market clearing requires, for all values of the arguments,
c1s(d;￿[d + ps(d;￿)];￿) + c2s(d;(1 ￿ ￿)[d + ps(d;￿)];￿) = d (83)
b1s(d;￿[d + ps(d;￿)];￿) + b2s(d;(1 ￿ ￿)[d + ps(d;￿)];￿) = 0 (84)
e1s(d;￿[d + ps(d;￿)];￿) + e2s(d;(1 ￿ ￿)[d + ps(d;￿)];￿) = 1; (85)










1s0(d;￿;s) ￿ b1s(d;￿[d + ps(d;￿)];￿)+e1s(d;￿[d + ps(d;￿)];￿)(d￿s0+ps0 [d￿s0;gs0(d;￿)])
and
w0
2s0(d;￿;s) ￿ b2s(d;(1￿￿)[d + ps(d;￿)];￿)+e2s(d;(1￿￿)[d + ps(d;￿)];￿)(d￿s0+ps0 [d￿s0;gs0(d;￿)])
Now, we will show how to ￿nd prices and portfolio allocations in this econ-
omy. We use the planning problem and identify the ￿ in that problem with the
corresponding variable here: the planning weight on agent 1 equals the relative
fraction of total wealth held in equilibrium by this agent.































22We see that ps(d;￿) = d^ ps(￿) solves this equation, delivering








+ (￿s2 + ￿v)
￿





This is a system of two functional equations.



















1 ￿ ^ e1s(￿)
￿
It is interesting to note here that bond holdings are proportional to d. Naturally,
they are zero in the special case v = 0, when e = ￿ and ￿
0 = ￿.






















































1 + ^ p2(￿
0
2)
￿ ￿ ^ e1s(￿) (90)
This is once more a system of two functional equations.
Neither bond holdings nor equity holdings depend directly on s, but they do
through the dependence of the ￿
0s on s.
The special case where ￿ = 0
We solve the problem for an ambiguity-averse agent who is measure zero in the
economy. This agent solves the problem




￿ [(￿ ￿ v)V (w0
1;d￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿ + v)V (w0
2;d￿2)]
subject to
c + qb + pde = w (91)
w0
1 = b + (￿1d + p￿1d)e (92)
w0
2 = b + (￿2d + p￿2d)e (93)
The FOCs with respect to b are
qu0(w ￿ qb + pde) =
= ￿ f(￿ ￿ v)u0 [b + e￿1d(1 + p) ￿ qb0 ￿ pd￿1e0] + (1 ￿ ￿ + v)u0 [b + e￿2d(1 + p) ￿ qb0 ￿ pd￿2e0]g
and with respect to e, they are
pdu0(w ￿ qb + pde) =
= ￿f(￿ ￿ v)u0 [b + e￿1d(1 + p) ￿ qb0 ￿ pd￿1e0]￿1d(1 + p)+
+(1 ￿ ￿ + v)u0 [b + e￿2d(1 + p) ￿ qb0 ￿ pd￿2e0]￿2d(1 + p)g




b + e￿1d(1 + p) ￿ qb0 ￿ pd￿1e0 +
1 ￿ ￿ + v








b + e￿1d(1 + p) ￿ qb0 ￿ pd￿1e0 +
(1 ￿ ￿ + v)￿2




b = ￿bw (94)
and






[￿b + ￿e￿1(1 + p)](1 ￿ q￿b ￿ p￿1￿e)
+
1 ￿ ￿ + v









[￿b + ￿e￿1(1 + p)](1 ￿ q￿b ￿ p￿1￿e)
+
(1 ￿ ￿ + v)￿2
[￿b + ￿e￿2(1 + p)](1 ￿ q￿b ￿ p￿2￿e)
￿
(1￿q￿b￿p￿e)
The problem of the consumer can be rewritten as




￿ [(￿ ￿ v)V (w0
1) + (1 ￿ ￿ + v)V (w0
2)]
subject to
c + qb + p^ e = w (96)
w0
1 = b + ^ e￿1(1 + p) (97)
w0
2 = b + ^ e￿2(1 + p); (98)
where ^ e ￿ de. The variable v will be chosen (due to the envelope theorem) so
that V (w0
1) = V (w0
2), i.e., so that w0
1 = w0
2. That means that b = ￿bw and






1 ￿ ￿ + v
￿b(1 ￿ q￿b)
￿
(1 ￿ q￿b): (99)
This expression simpli￿es to
￿bq = ￿ (100)
and then consumption is given by
c = (1 ￿ ￿)w: (101)
Since
p
1+p = ￿ in the ￿ = 1 case, this implies
￿b = (￿ ￿ v)￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿ + v)￿2: (102)
24Therefore,
v =











For ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 0:98 ￿1 = 1:02, and ￿2 = 1:01, ￿b = 2￿1￿2
￿1+￿2, and




A2 Proofs of subsection 5.3
We want to proof that
E(￿
0 j ￿) < ￿: (106)
Since
E(￿
0 j ￿) = ￿
￿(￿ ￿ v)
￿ ￿ ￿v
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿ + v)






+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿ + v)




2v2 < ￿v2: (109)
Since v 6= 0,
￿ < 1: (110)
And condition (110) is always true in the case we study, otherwise we would
be back to the case of one agent.























+ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ + v
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿v
: (111)






+ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ + v





+ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ + v
1 ￿ ￿
= ￿ ￿ v + 1 ￿ ￿ + v = 1: (112)
256.1 A3 Figures














Figure 1: Return on equity, risk-free return, and the equity premium as a function of the
risk aversion parameter (￿)















Figure 2: Return on equity, risk-free return, and the equity premium as a function of the
ambiguity aversion parameter (a)










Figure 3: Costs of business cycles as a function of the ambiguity-aversion parameter (a)













Figure 4: Cost of business cycles as a function of the risk-aversion parameter (￿)













Figure 5: Cost of business cycles as a function of the subjective discount factor (￿)











Figure 6: Value function W(￿)













Figure 7: Policy function v (￿)

























































































Figure 8: From left to right from top to bottom: (a) v(￿), (b) law of motion for
￿ (￿1 below the 45 degree line; ￿2 above the 45 degree line), (c) e1(￿), (d) share
of equity of agent 1, (e) q(￿), (f) b(￿)
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